This paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. The analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more e®ective in containing in°ationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or in°ation-indexed debt. If delegation of monetary policy is viable, the optimal policy is to issue conventional debt. This increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected in°ation, thus minimizing the in°ation needed to o®set supply shocks. Evidence on central bank independence, debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content.
Introduction
In the 1990s the share of long-term conventional debt has increased in almost all OECD countries. In the same period the governments of these countries have made their central banks more independent in order to strengthen the commitment to price stability. This paper examines the relative role of institutional design and public debt management for monetary policy.
The literature on public debt management suggests that in°ation-indexed debt enhances the credibility of anti-in°ationary policy. The argument has been made by Back and Musgrave (1941) and later formalized by Lucas and Stokey (1983) , Bohn (1988) , Calvo (1988) , Calvo and Guidotti (1990) . The same role for foreign currency debt has been suggested by Bohn (1990a Bohn ( , 1991 and Watanabe (1992) . This literature, however, implicitly assumes that the government cannot delegate monetary policy to an independent institution.
On the other hand, the literature on central bank independence points to policy delegation as the best way to reduce the in°ationary bias. Some attention is given to the implications of public debt, but not to its composition. Cukierman (1994) argues that the larger the debt the more likely it is that politicians will delegate authority to the central bank and the more independent the bank will be. Beetsma and Bovemberg (1997) show that delegation of monetary policy to a properly conservative central banker achieves the second-best in°ation tax on money balances without distorting debt accumulation, but they con¯ne attention to indexed debt.
As a matter of fact the interaction between the choice of debt instruments and the design of monetary institutions remains largely unexplored. This paper compares institutional design and debt management as alternative solutions to credibility problems, showing that the best solution is to delegate monetary policy to an independent central bank. The point is made within a standard rules-versus-discretion framework where output is a®ected by tax distortions and, thus, by the type of debt that the government issues.
The role of currency denomination and indexation of public debt depends on the monetary regime. If monetary policy can be delegated to an independent in°ation-averse institution or an in°ation contract is viable, then indexed or foreign currency debt are not needed for anti-in°ationary policy. The government should instead provide the monetary authority with the largest possible share of conventional debt to support output stabilization. Intuitively, a greater share of conventional debt implies lower taxes and tax distortions for any given unexpected in°ation. By increasing the sensitivity of output to in°ation, conventional debt makes monetary policy more e®ective: less unexpected in°ation is needed to counter supply shocks. Although conventional debt may give rise to in°ationary expectations, credibility problems are dealt more e®ectively by monetary policy delegation.
This result is important for two reasons. First, it supports the conventional wisdom that institutional design and, in particular, central bank independence is the best way to avoid the in°ationary bias, while little is gained by increasing the cost of in°ation with indexed or foreign currency debt. Secondly, it provides an explanation for the lengthening of debt maturity in OECD countries since the late 1980s reported in Missale (1999) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents evidence on debt composition. The government problem is set up in Section 3. Section 4 shows the role of debt instruments in committing to low in°ation when the government retains full discretion over the choice of the in°ation rate. Results are discussed in light of alternative speci¯cations of the social loss. The following section examines the role of debt management when monetary policy is delegated to an independent institution. Section 5.1 studies delegation to a weight-conservative central banker. Section 5.2 considers an in°ation contract while Section 5.3 focuses on in°ation targeting. Section 6 presents evidence on debt structure, central bank independence and in°ation which suggests that the normative argument has some positive content. Section 7 concludes.
Debt composition: evidence from OECD countries
Economists have long been puzzled by the absence of in°ation-indexed debt. Indeed, until the 1990s indexed bonds had been issued only in Australia and the UK, among OECD countries. Although a number of countries have then started an indexation program, the share of in°ation-indexed debt is still quite low. At the end of 1998 real bonds accounted for 16.4% of total gross debt in the UK, 6.5% in Sweden and 6.0% in Australia, but their share was as low as 2.5% in the US, 2.4% in New Zealand, 1.9% in Canada and 0.8% in France.
The reliance on¯xed rate debt denominated in domestic currency is surprising in that conventional debt should give rise to in°ationary temptations and lead to expectations of higher in°ation. The point was¯rst made by Back and Musgrave (1941) and later formalized within the time-consistency literature by Lucas and Stokey (1983) , Calvo (1988) and Bohn (1988) . Explanations of the use of conventional debt vary from the tax-smoothing argument that conventional debt o®ers budgetary insurance against supply shocks (Bohn 1988 (Bohn , 1990b and public spending shocks (Lucas and Stokey 1983, Calvo and Guidotti 1990) to arguments based on transaction costs, frictions and portfolio hedging (Fischer 1983) . As a matter of fact, foreign currency denominated debt o®ers an alternative, perhaps cheaper, commitment to (¯xed ex-change parity and) low in°ation (Bohn 1990a , 1991 , Watanabe 1992 .
1 Short maturity debt and°oating-rate debt are also e®ective as commitment devices. Missale and Blanchard (1994) show that in the period 1960-1989 in three highly indebted countries, Belgium, Ireland and Italy, the share of¯xed rate long-term debt displayed a negative relation with the debt-to-GDP ratio. Table 1 reports the percentage of foreign currency debt out of total central government debt for 20 OECD countries in the period . All the liabilities denominated in foreign currency have been grouped together, be they marketable securities or loans. Table 2 reports for the same period the percentage of¯xed rate debt denominated in domestic currency with an initial maturity longer than one year.
The share of foreign currency debt varies widely across countries: from zero in Germany, Japan, the Netherland, Switzerland and the US to almost 30% in Ireland and Sweden and up to 40% in Finland. These di®erences can partly be explained by institutional aspects 2 and also re°ect past di±culties and costs encountered by small economies in raising funds on domestic markets.
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The absence of foreign currency debt in countries whose currencies are used as foreign reserves is also noteworthy. This can be explained by lower cost of borrowing in reserve currencies but, in the case of Germany, Japan and Switzerland, also by a strong anti-in°ationary stance. The Netherlands clearly¯ts this explanation. Indeed, institutional aspects and the lack of liquid bond markets cannot fully account for the evidence in Table 1 . In particular, foreign currency debt was issued in large amounts by \high yielders", that is, countries where interest rates on conventional bonds re°ected expectations of a substantial depreciation of the domestic currency and in°ation fears. Debt managers may have issued foreign currency debt in an attempt to reduce the cost of debt servicing, to the extent that their expectations about currency depreciation were more optimistic than the market. As private investors' expectations re°ect the lack of con¯dence in the government's anti-in°ationary policy, this explanation clearly points to the problem of credibility as an important motivation for the government issuing policy. While the main insight from the timeconsistency literature |that debt management allows to establish the \credibility" of a particular policy| may not guide everyday policy-making, debt managers' reaction to high interest rates may in fact be based on the same motivations and lead to the same choice of debt instruments as those predicted by the theory.
The decline in the share of debt denominated in foreign currency, which takes place in many OECD countries since the late 1980s, is also remarkable. When we consider 1 For a discussion of funding in foreign currency see Pecchi and Ripa-di-Meana (1998) . 2 In a number of countries foreign currency debt is not used for de¯cit¯nancing but only for the purpose of managing foreign exchange reserves. This is now the case in Canada, Denmark and the UK. Sweden followed this rule until 1993.
3 Note that countries which relied more on foreign currency debt can be described as small (open) economies. These countries could obtain better conditions when borrowing abroad in reserve currencies than on domestic under-developed markets.
the share of¯xed rate long-term debt denominated in domestic currency shown in Table 2 , the lower use of instruments which provide protection against in°ation is evident. In the 1990s the share of long-term conventional debt has increased in all countries except those where such a share was already high. In the same period many countries have increased the independence of their central banks in order to strengthen their committment to price stability (see e.g. Eij±nger and De Haan 1996) . The argument of this paper is that central bank independence o®ers a better, more e±cient technology to commit to low in°ation and thus reduces the need for instruments which minimize in°ationary temptations.
In the following sections we focus on time-consistency motivations for the choice of debt instruments and highlight the role of the monetary regime in this decision.
The government problem
We examine the interaction between the monetary regime and debt management using a version of Barro and Gordon's (1983a) model of monetary policy where distortionary taxation creates a wedge between the¯rst-best level of output and its natural rate. We explicitly model this output loss which is the source of time inconsistency in the rules-versus-discretion literature (along with labor market distortions). Following Barro and Gordon we assume that the output loss depends on the tax rate but extend the analysis to consider that the tax rates varies with the real value of public debt (and the tax base; i.e. the level of output). The idea is that the level of output decreases with tax distortions and thus with the real value of public debt. In turn, the value of debt is determined by its composition and the unexpected in°ation and exchange rate depreciation which arise from the policy response to the shocks hitting the economy.
A welfare maximizing government weighs the costs of expected in°ation (and exchange rate depreciation) against the cost of output deviations from its optimal level in the absence of distortions. The expected social loss is equal to
where µ re°ects social preferences, i.e. the cost of in°ation relative to output deviations, ¼ denotes the in°ation rate, y is the logarithm of actual output and ¹ y is its natural rate. Finally, k(¿), is the output loss from tax distortions, modeled as an increasing convex function of the tax rate, ¿. The social loss function is further discussed in Section 4.1.
A time consistency problem arises in that the government aims at the level of output, y T = ¹ y + k(¿), that would emerge in the absence of distortions. In the literature, an output target greater than the natural rate is justi¯ed by the existence of either tax or labor market distortions or simply by political pressure (see Eij±nger and De Haan 1996 and Walsh 1998) . In what follows we shall focus on tax distortions. Output is given by a traditional Phillips curve:
where b is the output sensitivity to unexpected in°ation and u is an adverse output shock distributed on the compact support [u l ; u h ], with mean E 0 u = 0 and variance E 0 u 2 = ¾ 2 . Following the literature, we assume that the output loss k(¿) depends on the tax rate, but extend the analysis to allow the tax rate to vary with the real value of public debt. The latter is a®ected by unexpected in°ation depending on its currency composition, indexation and maturity structure.
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To maintain analytical tractability, we take a linear approximation of k(¿) around the expected tax rate E 0 ¿. Denoting with k 0 the¯rst derivative of k(¿), the latter is approximated by
Then, assuming that the entire debt and public spending are repaid at the end of the next period and using a linear approximation for the impact of in°ation, the tax rate is equal to
where G and B are the ratios of government spending and public debt to the natural rate of output, i and i ¤ are the nominal domestic and foreign interest rates, e is the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate, x is the share of in°ation-indexed debt, m denotes the share of¯xed rate debt in domestic currency, while (1 ¡ x ¡ m) is the share of foreign currency debt.
Using the uncovered interest parity condition i = i ¤ + E 0 e, assuming Purchasing Power Parity and normalizing foreign in°ation to zero, we can write the tax rate as 8 5 It is worth noting that, as the tax rate and thus distortions vary, so does the natural rate of output, ¹ y. This suggests that debt management may have implications for monetary policy even if the authorities target the natural rate of output.
6 Notice that under a special case k(¿ ) is linear in the tax rate. Abstracting from output shocks and following Beetsma and Bovemberg (1997) assume that output is given by Y = L a (0 < a < 1) where L is labor, so that maximization of after-tax pro¯t yields the labor demand
where W is the nominal wage. It follows that, if workers aim solely at a target real wage, the log of which is normalized to zero, and contracts are signed one period in advance based on in°ation expectations, then the log of output is given by y = (a=(1 ¡ a))(¼ ¡ E¼ ¡ ¿ + loga), and the output loss is k(¿ ) = (a=(1 ¡ a))¿ .
7 This also holds as an approximation since the tax rate depends on the realization of the output shock, u. We shall come back to this point in Section 4.1.
8 Note that, due to the linear approximation, unanticipated in°ation may turn the real value of
After replacing the value of ¿ in equation (3), we substitute equations (2) and (3) in the loss function (1) to obtain:
where
denotes the expected output loss due to tax distortions.
The sequence of events is as follows: (i) the government designs monetary institutions and chooses the debt composition; (ii) private agents forms rational in°ation expectations; (iii) the output shock realizes; (iv) the monetary authority sets the in°ation rate.
In the next section we¯rst derive the basic insights from the standard framework which adopts the loss function (1) and then discuss microfoundations and robustness when alternative speci¯cations are considered.
A dependent Central Bank
Consider a government that does not delegate monetary policy and retains full discretion over the choice of the in°ation rate. After observing the realization of the shock, u, the government chooses in°ation so as to minimize
where Z = b + k 0 mB denotes the marginal output gain from unexpected in°ation and depreciation and
is the expected output loss due to tax distortions.
Assuming rational expectations, in°ation and output are given by
is decreasing with the share of conventional debt, m. Therefore, in°ation and exchange depreciation allow the government to dampen the impact of output shocks |the more so the the lower is¸and thus the larger the debt negative, clearly a nonsense since the most in°ation can do is to cancel the debt. In order to rule out negative real payments, an upper bound on the distribution of u must be imposed such that
If we assume that the government can raise funds in domestic currency to lend in foreign currency, then m tends to in¯nity, but a positive upper bound would still exist and be equal to
is the share of conventional debt, m. However, as the private sector anticipates the incentive to in°ate, a larger share of conventional debt leads to higher expected and equilibrium in°ation, thus increasing the government loss. The expected loss, as of time 0 when the government chooses the indexation and currency denomination of the debt, is given by
The discretionary solution can be contrasted with the expected loss when the government credibly commits to zero in°ation and depreciation by following the \¯xed rule" ¼ = e = 0:
Noting that 0 ·¸· 1, equations (11) and (10) show that under the¯xed rule the government loses°exibility in reacting to output shocks but avoids the costs of expected in°ation. Indeed, the expected loss (10) depicts the trade o® between credibility and°exibility that is at the heart of the rules-versus-discretion literature. This trade o® is spanned by¸= µ=[µ + (b + k 0 mB) 2 ] varying between zero and one, and thus by the share of conventional debt, m.
The government can generally do better than the rule solution by choosing a proper, possibly negative, m, so as to select the optimal point on the credibility-°e xibility spectrum. 9 The optimal share of conventional debt increases with output variability, ¾ 2 , while it decreases with the temptation to in°ate which depends on tax distortions, D, and thus on the level of government expenditure and debt as in Bohn (1988) and Calvo and Guidotti (1990) . Hence |with a dependent central bank| in°ation-indexed debt and/or foreign currency debt (in amounts possibly exceeding the level of debt) are optimal if the impact of tax distortions on in°ationary expectations is large relative to the variance of output shocks.
The social loss function: an assessment
In this section we discuss the motivation behind the choice of the loss function (1) and examine whether the trade o® between credibility and°exibility, which emerges in our basic set-up, can be generalized to other speci¯cations.
The choice of the loss function is important because it de¯nes a particular regime, for example, it characterizes the preferences, the nature and extent of independence of the institution in charge of monetary policy. We adopt the loss function (1) which is 9 In fact, if the government can choose any debt combination, including the possibility to raise funds with one type of debt to lend in the other type, the expected loss under discretion can be made no greater than the loss under a¯xed rule. This conclusion follows immediately from the fact that the zero in°ation rule is equivalent to setting a negative m such that b + k 0 mB = 0 and hencȩ = 1. However, the government can do no better than opt for a¯xed rule when
standard in the literature on central bank independence (see Walsh 1998) and model the output loss as a function of the tax rate. A possible objection to this approach is that the marginal cost in welfare terms of tax distortions is relatively higher in bad states of nature, i.e. when adverse output shocks occur so that y ¡ ¹ y < 0 (as shown by equation (1)). This partly re°ects the assumption that society has a preference for stabilizing output°uctuations arising from nominal rigidities (see e.g. Walsh 1998 and Herrendorf and Neumann 1998) . However, the implication that the marginal cost of tax distortions is counter-cyclical is quite strong from the viewpoint of real business-cycle theory of output°uctuations where distortionary taxation is the only source of ine±ciency. In fact, in utility-based models where the output loss re°ects disincentives to work induced by proportional taxation of labor income (as opposed to losses from tax collection), the relation between the marginal cost of taxation and the level of output is uncertain (see Chari, Christiano and Kehoe 1994) . Intuitively, taxation could be less distortionary in bad output states as labor could be supplied more inelastically.
In the absence of nominal rigidities, a possible motivation for equation (1) is that a greater marginal cost in bad output states captures the higher tax rates that are required to ensure¯scal solvency.
10 In fact, the same implications can be derived from a speci¯cation of the loss function where the marginal cost of tax distortions is independent from the state of nature. The formal argument is as follows. Suppose that society cares about output expansions rather than output stabilization, as in Barro and Gordon (1983b) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) .
11 Then, the social loss is linear in output and tax distortions:
where the output loss from distortions is assumed to be quadratic in the tax rate. Although the marginal cost of taxation is independent from the output shock, u, the dependence of the tax rate from the level of output implied by the budget constraint may lead to the same speci¯cation as in equation (6). While this is easily veri¯ed in a one-period framework where tax revenues, ¿Y , must cover spending commitments and debt repayments, a negative relation between output shocks and the tax rate also emerges over longer horizons if the government smooths taxes. For instance, using the linear approximation around a zero output growth of the intertemporal budget constraint suggested by Bohn (1990b) , it can be shown that tax-smoothing implies the following tax rule:
10 Chari, Christiano and Kehoe show that, for reasonable parameter values, in bad states of nature it is optimal to cover most of the¯nancing needs in contingent markets for debt even when raising tax rates is e±cient.
11 The argument goes through independently of the presence of output in the loss function.
whereŷ t+i = y t+i ¡y t+i¡1 is the rate of output growth, G
is permanent (or normal) public expenditure relative to time t ¡ 1 output and
is the point of linearization for the tax rate. Then, assuming that initial output is at its natural level; i.e. y t¡1 = ¹ y and that output shocks are not persistent, so that E t y t+i = ¹ y for i = 1; 2; 3:::1, the tax rate is equal to
which can be substituted for ¿ t in equation (12) to yield a similar speci¯cation as equation (6). This motivation for equation (1) hinges however on tax-smoothing as the rule for¯scal policy. In fact, a series of negative output shocks will eventually force the government to raise taxes independently of the¯scal rule but such adjustments can be considerably delayed in the real world. If the government does not smooth taxes, then the persistence of shocks, the level of debt and the length of time intervals between monetary policy decisions are all relevant aspects to consider. If tax rates are invariant to economic activity, i.e. if
both output stabilization and tax variability are irrelevant for welfare. In this case raising funds in foreign currency to lend in conventional debt |i.e. a`negative' m| can completely remove the in°ationary bias at no cost. Hence, an argument for institutional design would have to be based on the existence of practical constraints to this funding policy.
Therefore, our analysis requires either that the government cares about output stabilization (i.e. because of nominal rigidities) and taxes a®ect output, or that it wants to stabilize tax rates which vary in response to output changes. Acknowledging that our analysis is not fully general, in what follows we maintain the motivating hypothesis that a trade-o® between credibility and°exibility exists, which depends on tax distortions, and can be improved upon by designing institutions besides choosing the debt composition. In Section 6 we shall provide evidence of a negative relation between central bank independence and the share of foreign currency and indexed debt which is consistent with the existence of such a trade-o®.
In the next section we consider the choice of debt instruments and highlight the role of the monetary regime in this decision. In particular, we study the case of a weight-conservative central banker and compare this solution to an in°ation contract and to in°ation targeting.
An independent Central Bank

A weight-conservative central banker
The role of foreign currency and in°ation-indexed debt as commitment devices which can possibly enhance the credibility of anti-in°ationary policy is a well known result in the literature on debt management. The new interesting issue is how debt policy interacts with and compares to institutional design as a solution to credibility problems. In fact, the natural solution to in°ationary temptations is delegation of monetary policy to an independent central banker where independence refers either to goal independence or instrument independence (operational independence). Rogo® (1985) shows that the appointment of a central banker with preferences characterized by a stronger aversion to in°ation than society |i.e. by a parameter µ B > µ | increases social welfare. In principle, society could choose the degree of conservativeness, µ B , of the central banker so as to attain the desired combination of credibility and°exibility.
12 By simple inspection of equation (10), noting thaţ
, it appears that the choice of debt composition could secure the same outcome as that of central bank independence. In fact, institutional design is a superior solution than indexed debt or foreign currency debt to the problem of reducing the in°ationary bias without losing°exibility.
In order to show that delegation of monetary policy improves on debt management solutions, consider the expected social loss, that is, the government loss when the central bank is goal independent:
where ¼ B and y B are the in°ation and output chosen by the central banker whose loss function is denoted by L B . Note that ¼ B and y B follow from the minimization of L B and thus depend on the preferences of the central banker µ B . Then, de¯ne with m ¤ the choice of debt composition that minimizes the expected loss under discretion (equation (10)) and the corresponding¸¤ = µ=
. It can be shown that, the social loss is reduced by choosing a greater share of conventional debt, m > m ¤ , and a central banker with a degree of conservativeness, µ B > µ, that implies the same¸=¸¤ as the optimal debt policy. Indeed, choosing µ B =¸¤(b+k 0 mB) 2 =(1¡¸¤), the welfare loss for society is equal to
which is lower than the loss obtained with the optimal debt policy since the central banker is more in°ation averse than society. This result is not surprising because delegation endows the government with an additional control mechanism thus enlarging the space of the possible outcomes. The interesting issue is how the possibility to use both mechanisms a®ects the banker selection and debt management. The optimal policy involves the choice of an extremely conservative central banker and the use of an in¯nitely large share of conventional debt. To see this note that the expected welfare loss (15) can be written as
From equation (17) it is clear that any increase in Z and µ B which increases the ratio Z 2 =µ B (and thus lowers¸B), while reducing Z=µ B , reduces the social loss. This is possible if µ B increases at a faster rate than Z but at a slower rate than Z 2 . To make an example, if we set Z = µ ® B , with 1=2 < ® < 1, then the social loss tends to the global minimum D 2 as µ B tends to in¯nity. The intuition for this result is as follows. A higher share of conventional debt enlarges the in°ation tax base and thus allows for lower conventional taxes and tax distortions for any given (unanticipated) in°ation.
13 By increasing the sensitivity of output to in°ation, conventional debt makes monetary policy more e®ective in stabilizing output°uctuations: less unanticipated in°ation is needed to counter negative supply shocks. It follows that more conventional debt, i.e. a lower¸B, helps to stabilize both output and in°ation as shown by equations (8) and (9). On the other hand, conventional debt gives rise to in°ationary temptations which, in the absence of institutional arrangements, would lead to a greater in°ation bias. This can be avoided if the government appoints an independent (weight-conservative) central banker. Equations (8) and (9) show that even when in°ation aversion, µ B , goes to in¯nity and in°ation tends to zero, the government need not give up output stabilization. This requires that the share of conventional debt increases so that¸B goes to zero (i.e. Z 2 =µ B goes to in¯nity), though at a slower rate than in°ation aversion (i.e. Z=µ B goes to zero).
In practice, the optimal policy is unfeasible. Realistically, the government would not be able to over-fund in conventional debt and invest the proceeds in foreign currency or indexed assets; there is a limit on the amount of nominal debt that can be issued. Then, it is optimal for the government to issue as much conventional debt as possible and choose the central banker accordingly. To see this, de¯ne with µ ¤ B the preferences of the central banker who minimizes the social loss for any given share, ¹ m, of conventional debt and, correspondingly,¸¤ B = µ
. Then, the social loss (15) can be written as
It is clear that a share of conventional debt, m, lower than ¹ m cannot reduce the social loss. If it could, µ ¤ B would not be optimal since an increase in µ B , that achieves 13 Alternatively, as shown by Bohn (1990a Bohn ( , 1990b , conventional debt reduces the need for a higher tax rate when negative supply shocks occur (see equation (14)).
the same e®ect on¸B as m > ¹ m, further reduces the second term of (18). On the contrary, the social loss can always be reduced by a higher m: any increase in µ B and m which leaves¸B =¸¤ B una®ected reduces the second term in (18). Therefore, the expected loss for society can be minimized by issuing the largest possible amount of nominal debt and appointing a correspondingly`very' conservative central banker. Intuitively, central bank independence is more e®ective in containing in°ationary expectations and should be used to enhance the credibility of anti-in°ationary policy, while conventional debt increases the sensitivity of output to surprise in°ation and thus reduces the need for°exibility. This is an important result that supports the conventional wisdom that institutional design and, in particular, central bank independence is the e®ective solution to in°ationary expectations while very little is gained by increasing the cost of in°ation with index and foreign currency debt.
14 This may also provide a rationale for the conventional belief that foreign currency debt is a sign of weakness of monetary policy rather than an incentive for low in°ation.
An in°ation contract
In this section we examine the role of debt denomination and indexation when the delegation mechanism takes the form of an in°ation contract between the government and the central bank. The linear contract proposed by Walsh (1995) and extended by Persson and Tabellini (1993) removes the in°ationary bias at no cost in terms of output stability, thus providing the best solution to the problem of establishing the credibility of monetary policy without losing°exibility.
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The optimal contract delegates monetary policy to a central banker with the same preferences as society (or it assigns to the central banker the social loss function) but imposes a linear cost to in°ation upon the monetary authority. Thus, the instrument independent but not goal independent central banker minimizes
where C is the linear penalty for in°ation outturns greater than zero. Except for the cost, C, the central banker is faced by the same problem as the government under discretion. After observing the shock u, the monetary authority chooses in°ation so as to minimize the loss L C subject to (2), (3) and (5).
Assuming rational expectations, expected in°ation is given by
and the in°ation bias can be eliminated by imposing a linear cost for in°ation equal to
Since the temptation for in°ationary¯nancing increases with conventional debt the cost, C, imposed on the central banker must increase with the share of such debt. Using this result, the solution to the government problem is equal to
which implies an expected loss for society equal to
By comparing equation (23) to equation (17) or (18) it can be shown that, if there is no constraint on the choice of the penalty |but there is a limit on the amount of conventional debt that can be issued| the in°ation contract provides a better solution than delegating policy to a weight-conservative central banker. More importantly from the point of view of debt management, it is clear that increasing the share of conventional debt (thus making¸small) reduces the impact of output shocks and thus the social loss. Intuitively, conventional debt makes taxes and output sensitive to unexpected in°ation thus minimizing the in°ation needed to o®set output shocks. As for the solution with a weight-conservative central banker a large, possibly in¯nite, share of nominal debt would be optimal; the social loss would tend to the global minimum D 2 as it does in Rogo®'s solution when both the degree of conservativeness of the central banker and the share of conventional debt go to in¯nity. However, the central bank contract requires a penalty for in°ation that increases with the share of conventional debt, as shown by (20) . Imposing such a cost can be problematic even if justi¯ed by the objective of avoiding income redistribution from debt holders to taxpayers or simply by the objective of defending the real value of wealth.
In°ation targeting
Finally, it is important to ask how these results relate to in°ation targets, as they currently operate in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. In e®ect, in°ation targets can be seen as the practical counterpart of either delegating policy to a weightconservative central banker (Canzoneri, Nolan and Yates 1997 and Haldane 1995) or choosing the contract solution (Svensson 1997) . Adopting Svensson's (1997) interpretation of an in°ation targeting regime, the central bank is given operational independence to minimize the following loss function
where ¼ T denotes the in°ation target. Hence, the central bank is assigned a loss function with a target for in°ation di®erent from the one which is socially optimal, say, ¼ ¤ = 0. It is easy to show that by¯xing a target equal to
the targeting regime yields the same solution as the in°ation contract. In particular, the expected loss for society, E 0 L T = D 2 +¸¾ 2 , is equal to the loss under the contract. While implications for debt management are the same as in the contract solution, it is worth noting that a high share of conventional debt would imply an in°ation target that, if not negative, could lie much below the socially optimal rate of in°ation, thus creating problems for the implementation of the optimal policy. 
Independence and debt structure: the evidence
In the previous section we have shown that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is the best solution to in°ationary temptations while conventional debt should be issued to support output stabilization. If this normative argument has a positive content, the share of such debt should increase with the independence of the central bank. Certainly, long-term conventional debt has gained importance since the late 1980s as shown in Table 2 and debt duration has lengthened as reported in Missale (1999) and Favero, Missale and Piga (2000) . Economists also agree that in this period central banks have enjoyed an increasing independence in the conduct of monetary policy (see e.g. Eij±nger and De Haan 1996, King 1998 ). However, a formal analysis of the relation between independence and debt structures is prevented by the lack of data on the time variation of independence. Thus, the prediction of a positive relation between independence and conventional debt is tested in this section using cross-sectional evidence for the 20 industrial OECD countries shown in Tables 1 and 2. 17 Central bank independence is measured by three main indexes in the literature: the index of political independence developed by Alesina (1989) (AL) ; the total index of political and economic independence of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) (GMT) and; the legal index of Cukierman (1992) (CU). Data on debt composition refer to gross central government debt except for Germany where the level is the general government. They are from national sources and are reported in Missale (1999) . Two measures of debt composition are considered: (i) the share of foreign currency and in°ation-indexed debt (foreign currency debt for short in what follows) and; (ii) the share of¯xed rate long-term debt. The former is de¯ned as the percentage of bonds and loans denominated in foreign currency or indexed to the price level. The latter is the percentage of¯xed rate bonds and loans denominated in domestic currency with an initial maturity longer than one year and is shown in Table 2 .
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The other macroeconomic variables used in the estimation are from OECD National Accounts and Economic Outlook. Table 3 reports pairwise correlations and rank correlations between the share of foreign currency and indexed debt in 1985 and the three indexes of central bank independence. We choose 1985 as the reference year since the indexes of independence refer to legal and institutional arrangements of the 1980s, but results are robust to the choice of other dates or the use of period averages. The correlation between the share of foreign-currency debt and the indexes of independence is negative, as expected, and signi¯cant at the 10% level for the AL index and at the 5% level for the GMT index. The correlation is not signi¯cant in the case of the CU index. The existence of a negative relation is evident from Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1 which plot the share of foreign debt against the AL index and GMT index, respectively. Stronger evidence in support of the theory comes from rank correlations in Table 3 . The Spearman correlation coe±cient is signi¯cant at the 5% level for both the AL and the GMT indexes.
The third row of Table 3 reports correlation coe±cients for the share of¯xed rate long-term debt denominated in the domestic currency which may better re°ect actual in°ation incentives than the share of debt denominated in foreign currency or indexed to the price level. In fact, a short maturity or variable interest rates limit the time for the impact of unexpected in°ation on the value of the debt. The correlations with the share of long-term conventional debt are strong and signi¯cant at the 5% level for both the AL and GMT indexes, while there is no evidence of correlation for the CU index. The same results hold true for rank correlations. The negative relation between the share of long-term conventional debt and the AL and GMT indexes is displayed in Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 1 .
To examine whether the relation between independence and debt structure is robust to the introduction of other variables, we estimate regressions of debt shares on independence indexes and a set of control variables, limiting the attention to the AL and GMT indexes for which a signi¯cant relation has been detected. We take debt shares as the dependent variable, even though the choice of debt composition and bank independence has been modeled as a joint decision taking place contemporaneously at the institutional stage of the game. This allows for a clearer presentation of the results and re°ects less frequent and more costly changes in institutional arrangements and central bankers compared to changes in the debt structure. Table 4 shows that the relation between debt shares and the AL and GMT indexes remains signi¯cant after controlling for the¯scal stance, the openness of the economy and the adoption of an exchange rate peg. Columns 1 to 4 show that the ratios of government consumption and gross debt relative to GDP in 1985 have no impact on debt composition. Incidentally, this result is quite robust; it holds for di®erent periods, for the use of period averages and for regressions with government de¯cits and interest payments. In the second part of Table 4 we control for an exchangerate peg and for the openness of the economy, as measured by the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP in 1985.
19 The exchange regime is important since a peg provides further commitment to low in°ation due to the costs associated with the realignments of the¯xed parity (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988) , and the greater transparency of the exchange rate (Herrendorf 1999) . Openness is suggested by its possible correlation with foreign currency debt emerged in Section 2. Furthermore, a larger tradable sector facing international competition may imply less distortions and thus in°ationary temptations, as shown by Lane (1997) . Columns 5 to 8 show that the AL and GMT indexes of independence perform better than the peg and openness and consistently in sign for the two debt shares. Controlling for exchange rate pegging even enhances the signi¯cance of the AL index in explaining variation in foreign currency debt. This is because exchange rate pegging provides a substitute for independence. When the GMT index is considered, openness appears to enlarge the share of foreign currency debt. There is instead no evidence that either openness or exchange rate pegging a®ect the share of long-term conventional debt.
We next examine the e®ect of political instability on the debt composition, using the index developed by Alesina and Perotti (1996) . Political instability is found by Miller (1997b) to signi¯cantly reduce the share of long-term conventional debt, possibly because of an in°ation-risk premium on long-term debt induced by higher in°ation uncertainty. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 5 show, however, that independence performs better than instability in three out of four cases: when foreign currency debt is considered and when independence is measured by the AL index. Political instability has a signi¯cant negative impact on the share of long-term conventional debt only with the GMT index. Columns 5 to 8 of Table 5 consider size and openness as potential determinants of debt composition, drawing from evidence in Section 2 of a greater use of foreign currency debt by small open economies. Indeed, the log of GDP in 1985 (in US dollars) accounts for most of the variation in foreign currency debt across OECD economies leaving no signi¯cant role to central bank independence. The last two columns of Table 5 show, however, that when long-term conventional debt is considered, the AL and GMT indexes remain signi¯cant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively, while size does not have a statistically relevant e®ect. If GDP is viewed as an indicator of the size of the securities market and its liquidity, this evidence suggests that the dimension of the market a®ects the cost and thus the choice between alternative instruments to commit to low in°ation. Although there may be a preference for short-term and variable rate-debt, only in large economies debt managers can rely on deep markets for such instruments while for small economies borrowing on foreign markets is more convenient.
The overall impression is that a relation between debt composition and independence exists which gives a potentially positive content to the theory developed in the previous sections. However, there are other important predictions regarding output variability and in°ation to be examined. A stronger testable implication is that a greater share of conventional debt helps to reduce output variability by making the stabilization policy of the monetary authority more e®ective (see equation (9)). To test this prediction we follow the standard procedure in the empirical literature stemming from Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and Alesina and Summers (1993) . We estimate regressions of the standard deviation of output growth on the AL and GMT indexes, while introducing the two measures of debt composition as additional explanatory variables. We consider the standard deviation of output growth for the period 1986-1997 so as to avoid potential endogeneity problems between output growth and debt structure. The result shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 is striking: a greater initial share of foreign currency debt signi¯cantly increases output variability. The e®ect is signi¯cant at the 5% level for both the AL and the GMT indexes and does not disappear when openness and log of GDP are introduced in the regression as control variables (see columns 5 and 6). Evidence on the impact of the debt structure is however mixed: when the share of¯xed rate long-term debt is considered no signi¯cant e®ect on output variability is found (see columns 3, 4, 7 and 8).
Finally, we examine the relation between average in°ation for the period 1986-1997, central bank independence and debt composition. Since monetary policy delegation does not completely eliminate the in°ation bias and the share of conventional debt is limited, in°ation is expected to decrease with independence and rise with the share of conventional debt or, in an in°ation targeting, bear no relation to it. Evidence in Table 7 contraddicts this prediction: the coe±cient of the share of longterm conventional debt is negative and signi¯cant with both the AL and the GMT index. This result is robust to the introduction of a dummy variable for exchange rate pegging (see columns 3 and 4) and the consideration of the debt-to-GDP ratio (see columns 7 and 8). As expected, both independence and exchange rate pegging signi¯cantly reduce in°ation.
The negative relation between in°ation and long-term conventional debt may re-°e ct inverse causality running from in°ation to the debt composition. A high in°ation environment is likely to be associated with high expected in°ation and in°ation variability making it more costly to issue¯xed rate long-term debt. Likewise a lower share of long-term conventional debt may re°ect a policy reaction to high in°ation in an attempt to reduce in°ationary expectations, as suggested by King (1998) and Mandilaras and Levine (2000) . In either case the estimated relation su®ers from an endogeneity problem that the use of initial period debt shares cannot solve, since average future in°ation is tipically correlated with long-term interest rates.
To conclude, the observed debt structures in industrial OECD countries are consistent with the prediction that more independent central banks allow governments to issue a larger share of conventional long-term debt. However, the negative relation between in°ation and long-term conventional debt suggests an alternative explanation to the commitment motivation. The positive relation between independence and conventional debt may simply re°ect the lower in°ation environment that characterizes countries with more independent central banks. So far we have been unable to construct a test that allows to distinguish between these two competing but related explanations. We leave the investigation of this issue to future research agenda.
Conclusions
While the role of central bank independence in securing low and stable in°ation is undisputed, the idea that indexed and foreign currency and debt may create incentives and expectations for low in°ation is not always accepted. This paper argues that the e±cacy of debt characteristics as incentives for anti-in°ationary policy depends on the choice of the monetary regime. We show that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is a better solution to credibility problems than increasing the costs of in°ation by issuing indexed debt, foreign currency debt and short-term conventional debt. Furthermore, an independent central bank may bene¯t from¯xed rate conventional debt, possibly of a long maturity, since such debt increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected in°ation, thus minimizing the in°ation needed to counter supply shocks. This explanation is consistent with the decline in the share of debt denominated in foreign currency and the lengthening of debt maturity that has taken place since the late 1980s in OECD countries, with the establishment of increasingly independent central banks. 
